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The Solyndra case: An Institutional Economics perspective on the optimal role of 
government support for green technology development. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
More than three years after its highly publicized bankruptcy, Solyndra continues 
to resonate as an example of well-intentioned government policies gone wrong.  This 
paper examines the Solyndra case using an institutional economics perspective to 
determine if the government’s relationship with the firm was optimal in achieving 
environmental and energy public policy goals while minimizing risk.  The analysis 
reveals several government deviations from theory prescribed best practice, and 
illustrates opposing theoretical governance prescriptions for stimulating future 
technological innovation at the macro and micro levels.    
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“Subsidizing SolarCity. A California solar-panel company could be another Solyndra in 
the making” – National Review Online headline November 25, 2013 (Styles, 
2013) 
 
 “Obama Restarts Solyndra Program, But Solyndraphobia Could Ruin It” – Time magazine 
headline – July 3, 2014 (Grunwald, 2014). 
 
1.0 Introduction 
Solyndra’s widely reported 2011 bankruptcy involved a U.S. government loss of 
$535 million in federal loan guarantees. As the headlines above attest, the Solyndra 
failure has also become a prominent example in the debate over the degree and manner 
that government should support socially beneficial firms and industries with minimal 
financial risk to the government (Ambec et al., 2013; Hardgadon and Kenney, 2012).  
The purpose of this case study is to examine the U.S. government’s relationship with 
Solyndra using the lens of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), and Agency Theory (AT).  
These institutional economic (IE) theories provide useful frameworks for evaluating 
inter-organizational relationships characterized by difficult contracting environments, and 
predict that the optimal governance form is dependent on various relationship 
characteristics such as the presence of specific assets, asymmetric information, and 
environmental uncertainties (Aghion and Tirole, 1994; de Figueiredo, 2010; Finon and 
Perez, 2007; Perez and Ramos-Real 2009).  By examining the conditions present during 
the U.S. government’s relationship with Solyndra, IE can thereby prescribe the 
relationship format least likely to produce failure (Coase, 1964; Wolter and Veloso, 
2008).    
A historic case methodology employing a variety of well-respected media reports 
during the firm’s rise and fall is utilized to provide in-depth insight into Solyndra’s 
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business practices and relationship with the U.S. government.  In so doing, the analysis 
provides perspective in structuring future relationships between the public and private 
sectors to minimize the inherent risks of innovation development and commercialization.  
The original promise of the Solyndra technology and notoriety of the Solyndra 
bankruptcy meant the firm’s history was widely covered, which allows key facts to be 
crosschecked among multiple sources to ensure accurate reporting (Golder and Tellis, 
1993).  The following section provides a brief history of Solyndra and government 
support for renewable energy as contextual background for the subsequent IE analysis of 
the case.   
 
2.0 Solyndra and Market Failure in the Renewable Energy 
In 2005 Solyndra was founded to develop cylindrical shaped photovoltaic (PV) 
solar panels that would utilize silicon-free thin-film, which was expected to make the 
panels less expensive and more efficient than traditional silicon based flat panels (Leonig 
and Stephens, 2011).  Part of the perceived market opportunity was based on the 
increasing demand for solar panels, which in turn led to an 800% silicon price increase 
between 2004 and 2008 and dramatically increased manufacturing costs for silicon based 
panels (Morales and Roca, 2011).  Furthermore, Solyndra’s cylindrical panels were 
expected to be less expensive to install and less susceptible to the wind damage, while 
prototype testing suggested that the design might be 7% more efficient than flat panels in 
converting sunlight into electricity (Green, 2008; Scansen, 2011).  
Solyndra’s projected cost and efficiency advantages were instrumental in 
attracting $78 million in initial capital from a few prominent investors, yet in 2005 these 
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design advantages were largely theoretical and would eventually require nearly $600 
million in research and manufacturing capability investments before large-scale 
production started in 2008 (Wang, 2008).  Thus in December 2006, Solyndra 
management applied to the Department of Energy’s (DOE) loan guarantee program to 
secure funding for the commercialization of the new design (Hayward, 2011).  Delays in 
the full implementation of the DOE program and reservations about Solyndra’s 
application from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) meant that the $535 
million loan guarantee did not receive final approval until September 2, 2009.  The 
widely reported application approval and new factory groundbreaking also closely 
coincided with a further $219 million cash infusion from private investors (Hayward, 
2011).  In May 2010 U.S. President Obama and California Governor Schwarzenegger 
turned up at the new factory and stated that ‘the true engine of economic growth will 
always be companies like Solyndra’ (Hayward, 2011).   
Even before finishing the new factory in 2010, however, Solyndra was selling 
only about half the existing plant’s capacity as the cylindrical panel shape was proving to 
be a incompatible with large market segments consisting of electric utility installations 
requiring millions of panels, as well as most residential installations (Scansen, 2011).  
High development costs also meant that Solyndra’s panels were costing about $4 per watt 
to manufacture, which was far higher than the 75 cents per watt charged by makers of flat 
panels that were benefiting from the falling price of silicon (Morales and Roca, 2011).  
Yet the government loan guarantee approval and publicity from the presidential visit 
helped Solyndra raise another $175 million in private equity during this same time frame 
(Hayward, 2011). 
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By early 2011, Solyndra management argued that debt subordination was 
necessary for the firm to successfully attract the additional private capital needed for 
survival, and in February 2011 the DOE approved a restructuring of the loan guarantee 
that put private equity investors ahead of the U.S. Government in the event of bankruptcy 
liquidation (Hayward, 2011). Although the debt restructuring did attract further private 
investment, it was insufficient to prevent the September 2011 bankruptcy declaration, 
which resulted in the termination of the firm’s entire workforce and a U.S. Government 
loss on the $535 million loan guarantee (Hayward, 2011). 
As the brief history of Solyndra attests, government support in financing the 
development and commercialization of what was thought to be a promising solar panel 
technology also proved to be influential in attracting additional private investments. In 
fact the DOE loan guarantee program that Solyndra benefited from was designed ‘to 
support innovative clean energy technologies that are typically unable to obtain 
conventional private financing due to high technology risks’ (Hayward, 2011).   
 
2.1 Government Intervention in Renewable Energy 
Market failure is a term that is commonly used to describe high-risk cases that do 
not attract adequate levels of private investment for meeting the future needs of society, 
and is a common rationale given for government intervention that can include subsidies 
and other types of support designed to reduce private sector investment risks (Grossman, 
2009; Hayley and Schuler, 2011).  From an economic perspective, rent appropriation and 
development uncertainty are two major types of risks often behind the market’s failure to 
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adequately respond to energy security and environmental threats with appropriate 
amounts of green technology investment (Grossman, 2009; Lipton and Kraus, 2011). 
Rent appropriation occurs when investors are not able to garner a fair share of 
their investment’s expected returns, typically due to ‘public goods’ related issues (Aghion 
and Tirole, 1994; Grossman, 2009; Sovacool, 2011).  Public goods issues occur with 
many green technologies when investors are unable to charge higher prices to customers 
for the value provided by environmental benefits such as cleaner air that could result 
from widespread adoption of green technologies.  Thus a public good cannot be fully 
contracted for and appropriated by green technology investors unless there are long-term 
guarantees of governmental subsidies or other supports (Aghion and Tirole, 1994; Haley 
and Schuler, 2011; Langniss and Praetorius, 2006).  Rent appropriation is particularly 
relevant with renewable energy investments, because renewably generated electricity 
offers no tangible quality advantages over carbon-based sources besides the ‘public good’ 
lower emissions that could otherwise provide innovators with compelling selling points 
(Olson, 2014).   
Uncertainty is defined by the inability to accurately predict future outcomes, 
which can create investor risk when the uncertainty brings the possibility of a negative 
consequence.  Thus development uncertainty is based on the degree to which technology 
investments are uncertain to yield a marketable product from which to pay back the 
investment.  Development uncertainty is higher when the relative development speed of 
competing technologies is high, which may mean that any current competitive gaps in 
costs/efficiency will not be sufficiently closed with further investments in a particular 
technology, such as Solyndra’s cylindrical thin-film panels.   Development uncertainty 
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can also be increased due to unstable market conditions that influence the likelihood of 
achieving an attractive ROI, such as decreasing carbon-fuel prices, or changes in 
government policies towards various energy alternatives (Lipton and Krauss, 2011).  
Thus development uncertainty means an increased risk that any individual technology 
can become obsolete and/or uncompetitive, and also means that investors will not wish to 
be locked into long-term relationships.  The desire to correct market failure is what leads 
government agencies into relationships with firms such as Solyndra as a means to reduce 
private investors’ risk (Haley and Schuler, 2011). 
 
3.0 Institutional Economics 
Although the DOE loan guarantees reduce private investor risk, this does not 
mean that the government does not also seek to minimize its contractual hazards (or 
risks) in providing support to individual firms such as Solyndra.  Institutional economic 
theories were developed to provide an analytic framework for minimizing the failure rate 
of organizational relationships characterized by incomplete contracts (Aghion and Tirole, 
1994; Coase, 1964; Grossman, 2009).  IE holds that institutions are man-made 
interdisciplinary creations that structure political, economic, and social interactions 
through both informal constraints (i.e. sanctions, taboos, traditions), and formal rules (i.e. 
laws) (North 1991; Williamson 1996).  Thus a key question to be answered is whether the 
form and type of relationship between the U.S. government and Solyndra was least likely 
to result in government financial losses, while at the same time continuing to support 
public policy goals for the development and commercialization of renewable energy.  
The next sections will analyze the Solyndra case using two major IE schools:  1) 
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Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), and 2) Agency Theory (AT).  TCE and AT offer 
complementary conceptual frameworks for understanding economic organization, and 
both approaches use the contract as a metaphor to examine the efficiency of inter-
organizational relationships  (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker, 1992; Williamson, 1988; 1996).     
 
3.1 Transaction Cost Economics 
 
TCE focuses on organizing relationships between parties that can range from 
arm’s length market transactions to various types of formal hierarchies (Williamson, 
1985).  TCE prescribes the type of contractual relationship that is most likely to minimize 
the dangers and associated transaction costs posed to either side by bounded rationality 
(e.g. inability to gather and process all relevant information) and opportunism (e.g. self 
interest seeking with guile) (Williamson, 1985; 1996).  Bounded rationality and 
opportunism are most problematic when the relationship features:  a) high transaction 
complexity due to development uncertainty, b) a need for specific investments, and c) 
performance measurement difficulties (Williamson, 1996).  Such conditions are 
frequently present during new product development, which can allow management to 
opportunistically misrepresent their technological and organizational capabilities and 
thereby expose investors to higher risk (Flyvbjerg, Garbuio, and Lovallo, 2009; Teece, 
1996; Williamson, 1985).   
The Solyndra case presented investors with a number of macro and micro level 
uncertainties leading to high transaction complexity.  On the most macro level, the 
attractiveness of renewable energy is largely dependent on the certainty of predictions 
regarding reduced supplies and rising prices for carbon-based fuels, but the many 
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government predictions regarding the imminent depletion of such supplies during the past 
100 years have so far proven to be ‘false alarms’ (Grossman, 2009). Similarly, climate 
model predictions of dangerous global warming have been called into question by the 
lack of measurable warming since the late 1990s, creating uncertainty and lowering 
public support for renewable energy subsidies that help make the industry attractive to 
private investors (Economist, 2013; Mead, 2011).  At the micro-level, a great deal of the 
uncertainty concerns the relative progress of competing renewable energy technologies 
such as solar or wind in reducing costs and/or improving efficiency (Evans, Strezov and 
Evans, 2008; Kannon et al., 2006).  Similarly within the solar technological arena there is 
uncertainty regarding the development potential of silicon versus thin-film panel 
technologies, photovoltaic versus concentrated solar power, and flat versus cylindrical 
panels.  These macro and micro-level uncertainties for renewably generated electricity 
create difficulties for policy makers as they try focus support on the technologies that will 
provide the most cost-efficient means of achieving environmental and energy security 
policy goals.   
Specific investments are represented in the Solyndra case by the specialized 
equipment and processes required for the manufacture of the innovative cylindrical solar 
panels, which were incompatible with traditional flat panel manufacturing and therefore 
valueless to other solar panel manufacturers (Styles, 2011).  TCE assumes higher 
efficiency for assets that are designed for specific applications versus general-purpose 
assets, but specific investments create conditions ripe for opportunistic behavior since 
they are not easily redeployed in the event of relationship failure and thereby increase the 
risk of capital investment loss (Langniss and Praetorius, 2006; Williamson, 1987).     
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Performance measurement problems occur when investors have difficulty 
assessing whether firm management has fulfilled relationship obligations.  The problems 
are magnified by asymmetric information that can create the possibility for opportunistic 
gain on the part of management, which is in the best position to know about certain risks 
pertaining to the achievement of technology, quality, or financial goals.  Asymmetric 
information based opportunism is suggested by Solyndra management’s almost 
continuous use of overly optimistic sales projections to secure additional private and 
public financing right up to the firm’s bankruptcy declaration (Leonig and Stephens, 
2011; Wald, 2011).   
TCE typically classifies debt investments as representing market transactions, and 
equity investments as representing hierarchical governance (Pisano, 1989; Teece, 1996; 
Williamson, 1988; 1996).  With respect to the DOE and Solyndra relationship, the DOE 
loan guarantee to Solyndra is thus representative of an arm’s length relationship with 
Solyndra management, because the only future interaction between the parties was a 
specified repayment plan to prevent default.  In contrast, the presence of high uncertainty, 
substantial specific investments, and performance ambiguity in the Solyndra case means 
TCE would predict that hierarchical governance, such as a contract specifying 
performance milestones for both sides, and close monitoring of firm management through 
investor board membership, would be a more efficient relationship format (Teece, 1996; 
Williamson, 1988; 1996).  Yet the DOE loan guarantees can also be classified as a 
hierarchical relationship with Solyndra’s private investors, because the guarantees 
provided long-term risk exposure to the government in the case of a Solyndra default on 
the debt held by private investors.   
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 Given the goals of the DOE loan program, however, it is not difficult to speculate 
why the DOE relationship with Solyndra is primarily based on the less efficient arm’s 
length transaction. First, the DOE loan program was designed to not only aid a wide 
variety of green technology firms, ranging from wind power developers to electric car 
manufacturers, but also serve as an economic stimulus by deploying aid as quickly as 
possible (Hayward, 2011).  Putting together contracts with well defined performance 
milestones for a large numbers of disparate green technology firms would certainly slow 
the process of allocating financial aid, particularly under conditions with so much macro 
and micro-level complexity and uncertainty.  Yet as TCE predicts, a market based 
relationship under these conditions also decreased the DOE’s ability and incentive to 
monitor Solyndra’s performance and created the potential for the opportunistic behavior 
demonstrated by Solyndra management.  
From a portfolio perspective, however, TCE does support the DOE’s market 
governance based investments in a wide variety of competing technologies, but only if 
such support could be quickly withdrawn when particular technologies, such as 
Solyndra’s thin-film cylindrical panels, prove to be uncompetitive (Wolter and Veloso, 
2008).  Yet the DOE hierarchical relationship with Solyndra’s private investors prevented 
such quick withdrawal due to the necessity of providing long-term reassurance to attract 
private capital.  Given the public policy desirability of supporting cleaner and more 
secure energy sources, such long-term reassurances in the Solyndra case were provided 
by the loan guarantees, the subordination of government claims on Solyndra assets 
relative to private equity investors, and the high profile visits of top government officials 
as a form of reputational hostage-taking (Langniss and Praetorius, 2006; Williamson, 
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1983).  Thus these longer-term government reassurances to private Solyndra investors 
locked the government into a relationship with an unviable firm and technology.    
 
3.2 Agency Theory 
 
While the transaction is the basic TCE unit of analysis, the agent is AT’s focus of 
attention (Bergen et al., 1992; Williamson, 1988).   In the current case, Solyndra’s 
management is the agent, and the DOE is the principal that depends on Solyndra to 
undertake the task of developing efficient solar panels to achieve the DOE’s public policy 
goals.  AT assumes that the principal and agent have bounded rationality, partly differing 
goals and risk preferences, and information asymmetry with the agent knowing more 
about its own abilities, motivation, and actions than the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989).  The 
principal’s task is to determine the most efficient means of: 1) selecting agents that have 
the desired qualities (a.k.a. adverse selection), and 2) monitoring the agent’s performance 
to ensure the fulfillment of contractual obligations (a.k.a. moral hazard) (Akerlof, 1970; 
Eisenhardt, 1989).    
Overcoming adverse selection means selecting a qualified agent and avoiding the 
unqualified, which is typically accomplished through some combination of: (1) screening 
for qualified candidates; (2) examining quality signals from potential agents; or (3) 
providing opportunities for self-selection (Bergen et al., 1992; Kirmani and Rao, 2000).  
During the screening process, potential principals (i.e. investors) can reduce adverse 
selection risk by utilizing experts to validate the prospective agent’s technological and 
market claims (Teece, 1996).  Such an evaluation might have utilized a macro-level 
approach by comparing the potential of Solyndra’s new panels to compete with other 
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renewable energy technologies, as well as with the carbon-based energy supplies they 
hope to displace.  For example, recent empirical comparisons of PV solar generated 
electricity versus natural gas, coal, and nuclear generated electricity find that PV solar 
costs would need to be reduced by over 50% for solar to be competitive (Olson, 2014, 
2015), which is well beyond the 7% best case efficiency improvements promised by the 
Solyndra panel innovation.  On a more micro-level, experts might also have noted that 
Solyndra’s economic prospects could be severely limited by cylindrical panel 
incompatibility with the needs of large solar panel market segments (Scansen, 2011). 
For a number of practical reasons, the DOE loan guarantee program relied on 
screening as the primary method for dealing with the adverse selection problem, and 
during the last days of the Bush administration the OMB found Solyndra’s application 
deficient for a number of reasons, but deferred the final decision to the incoming Obama 
administration (Hayward, 2011).  The Obama inauguration brought the passage of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which also set a deadline of September 30, 
2011 to spend all the program’s money as a means of stimulating the economy.  This put 
all undecided applications for DOE loan guarantees on a fast review track that bypassed 
‘quality control’ steps according to a 2010 audit of the DOE program (Saunders, 2011).   
While the DOE time pressure was responsible for the rushed and incomplete 
screening of Solyndra’s prospects, the fact that Solyndra and many of the other DOE 
applicants were newly established firms also meant that other methods of dealing with 
adverse selection were difficult to effectively deploy.  For example, the DOE could not 
rely on signals of quality or self-selection in the Solyndra case, because the firm and its 
private investors had no previous history in developing renewable energy technology, 
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while also having few resources to survive a lengthy and onerous application process.  
On the other hand, it could be argued that Solyndra successfully employed false signals 
to favorably influence the DOE during the application review by spending more than $1 
million in government lobbying and Obama presidential campaign donations.  This 
spending resulted in the head of the loan guarantee program pushing the DOE to move 
faster in approving the Solyndra application (Hayward, 2011; Leonig and Stephens, 
2011; Mosk and Greene, 2011).  Although Solyndra’s substantial private capitalization 
would ordinarily be seen as an example of credible ‘skin in the game’ commitments, the 
use of campaign donations to pressure DOE officials into a hurried application approval 
suggest this signal was not an accurate indication of agent quality.  This false signal in 
combination with the political desire to quickly stimulate the economy with green 
industry financial aid, was clearly at odds with the AT suggestion to carefully screen 
Solyndra’s prospects to reduce adverse selection risk.   
Once the agent is selected, the next problem is to avoid post-contractual 
opportunism or moral hazard, which is most typically associated with an agent’s shirking 
attempts by claiming high quality output when it has not actually been achieved (Klein 
and Leffler, 1981; Mishra, Heide, Cort, 1998). Environmental uncertainty makes it 
impossible to write a contract that foresees and provides for all contingencies, and thus 
forces principals and agents to keep the resulting risks in mind when structuring the 
details of a contractual relationship (Bergen, et al., 1992).  After the DOE approval of 
Solyndra’s application, several actions provide evidence of moral hazard problems 
related to management incompetence and opportunism.  For example, Solyndra 
management failed to provide DOE officials with an accurate picture regarding their 
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financial prospects when applying for government support (Hayward, 2011; Leonig and 
Stephens, 2011).  Furthermore, many Solyndra employees wondered why a new 
manufacturing plant was being built when the old plant was running at only 50% of 
capacity, and why management was spending heavily on lavish offices and experimental 
manufacturing equipment that no one knew how to use (Hayward 2011; Leonig and 
Stephens, 2011).  Private investors in Solyndra might also argue that moral hazard 
existed going the other direction due to government shirking regarding the failed 
implementation of promised cap and trade policies that would make carbon-based energy 
more expensive and renewable energy sources relatively more competitive (Mead, 2011).   
To prevent these moral hazard problems, AT suggests that contracts provide 
incentives that align the interests of both the principal and agent (Eisenhardt, 1989).  For 
example, the DOE might have followed venture capital practice through the use of equity 
or equity convertible forms of financial aid.  Such an ownership position would have 
provided Solyndra private investors and management with reassurance of the 
government’s relationship commitment, while providing the government with further 
incentive to monitor Solyndra’s business practices to increase the chances of receiving an 
equity owner’s share of future dividends or public stock offering returns (Hargadon and 
Kenney, 2012).   
4.0 Discussion and Conclusion 
Moving from a carbon-dominated energy economy to one based on clean 
renewable technologies, such as solar energy, has been seen as key to achieving energy 
security and environmental public policy goals for several decades, yet significant 
progress in making such a transformation is likely to require many more decades (EIA, 
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2013).  In contrast to this multi-decade green transformation perspective, the desire to 
stimulate an ailing economy meant that months instead of years were used to dispense 
green technology financial aid to firms such as Solyndra, and such speed was further 
encouraged through Solyndra’s lobbying efforts.  From an IE perspective, the current 
analysis suggests that the U.S. government made less than optimal policy choices in their 
relationship with Solyndra, and this conflicting time perspective is likely an important 
reason for the relationship failure. 
The TCE analysis of the Solyndra case finds a number of uncertainties with 
regards to the renewable energy sector, together with specific investments required to 
manufacture the unique panel design, which created a situation that was unlikely to 
attract substantial private-sector investment.  The DOE loan guarantees and the very 
public endorsement of Solyndra and the solar industry by top government officials 
provided risk reducing assurances to attract private investment to at least some degree, 
but was likely a less efficient option than the contractual relationship with performance 
benchmarks suggested by TCE analysis.  AT analysis of the Solyndra case found less 
than optimal government oversight of the selection and monitoring process that likely 
created adverse selection and moral hazard problems, which would have been more 
efficiently resolved by a contractual relationship offering incentives to Solyndra 
management to provide the low cost and efficient renewable energy technology desired 
by government policy makers.  Perhaps the biggest IE criticism of the DOE’s loan 
guarantee program comes from the fact that poor macro-level screening was done to 
determine if any applicant’s solar technology was likely to be competitive with carbon-
based energy sources.  Government incentives to commercialize green technologies will 
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make adverse selection inevitable if the particular technology, such as the Solyndra 
panels, is not cost competitive versus the ‘brown’ alternatives they are expected to 
displace.  Thus when screening reveals a particular green technology/firm to be very 
uncompetitive with conventional alternatives, it will likely be more cost efficient if IE 
analysis is utilized to structure government relationships with R&D providers that might 
generate innovations that can close current financial and technical gaps (Hargadon and 
Kenney, 2012; Olson, 2015; Victor and Yanosek, 2011).    
  21 
 
5.0 References 
 
Aghion, P.  & Tirole, J. (1994) ‘The Management of Innovation.’ The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 109 No. 4, pp. 1185-209. 
 
Akerlof, G. (1970) 'The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism.’ Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84 No. 3, pp. 488-500. 
 
Ambec, S., Cohen, M.A., Elgie, S. & Lanoie, P. (2013) ‘The Porter Hypothesis at 20: 
Can Environmental Regulation Enhance Innovation and Competitiveness?.’ Review of 
Environmental Economics and Policy, Vol. 7 No. 1, pp. 2-22.  
 
Bergen, M, Dutta, S. & Walker, O.C. (1992) ‘Agency Relationships in Marketing: A 
Review of the Implications and Applications of Agency and Related Theories.’ Journal 
of Marketing, Vol. 56 (July), pp. 1-24. 
 
Coase, R.H. (1964) ‘Discussion.’ American Economic Review, Vol. 54 No. 3, pp. 194-97. 
 
de Figueiredo Jr., R. J. P. (2010) ‘A Tribute to Oliver Williamson: Institutions, Politics, 
and Non-Market Strategy.’ California Management Review, Vol. 52 No. 2, pp. 123-131. 
 
Economist (2013) ‘Climate Change, A Cooling Consensus.’ Economist, (July 20) 
[online]  http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/06/climate-change. 
(Accessed 25 October 2014). 
 
EIA (2013) ‘Annual Energy Outlook 2013.’ US Energy Information Administration 
DOE/EIA-0383, (April) [online] http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383(2013).pdf. 
(Accessed 25 October 2014). 
 
Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989) ‘Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review.’ Academy of 
Management Review, Vol. 14 No. 1, pp. 57-74. 
  
Evans, A., Strezov, V. & Evans, T.J. (2008) ‘Assessment of Sustainability Indicators for 
Renewable Energy Technologies.’ Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, pp. 
1082-1086. 
 
Finon, D. & Perez, Y. (2007) ‘The Social Efficiency of Instruments of Promotion of 
Renewable Energies: A Transaction-Cost Perspective.’ Ecological Economics, Vol. 62 
No. 1, pp. 77-92. 
 
Flyvbjerg, B., Garbuio, M. & Lovallo, D. (2009) ‘Delusion and Deception in Large 
Infrastructure Projects: Two Models for Explaining and Preventing Executive Disaster.’ 
California Management Review, Vol. 51 No. 2, pp. 170-93 
 
Golder, P.N. & Tellis, G.J. (1993) ‘Pioneer Advantage: Marketing Logic or Marketing 
Legend?’  Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 30 (May), pp. 158-70. 
  22 
 
Green, H. (2008) ‘Tubular Solar Panels Slash Costs, Boost Efficiency.’ Ecogeek.org, 
(July 10) [online] http://www.ecogeek.org/content/view/2187/83/. (Accessed 25 October 
2014).   
 
Grossman, P.Z. (2009) ‘U.S. Energy Policy and the Presumption of Market Failure.’ Cato 
Journal, Vol. 29 (Spring/Summer), pp. 295-317. 
 
Grunwald, M. (2014) ‘Obama Restarts Solyndra Program, But Solyndraphobia Could 
Ruin It.’ Time, (July 3, 2014) [online] http://time.com/2955312/obama-solyndraphobia-
clean-energy/. (Accessed 25 October 2014). 
 
Hardgadon, A.B., & Kenney, M. (2012) ‘Misguided Policy? Following Venture Capital 
into Clean Technology.’ California Management Review, Vol. 54 No. 2, pp. 118-139. 
 
Hayley, U.C.V. & Schuler, D.A. (2011) ‘Government Policy and Firm Strategy in the 
Solar Photovoltaic Industry.’  California Management Review, Vol. 54 No. 1, pp. 17-38. 
 
Hayward, S.F. (2011) ‘President Solyndra and His Mean Green Wealth-Wasting 
Machine.’ The Weekly Standard, (October 3) [online] 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/president-solyndra_594151.html. (Accessed 25 
October 2014). 
 
Kannon, R, Leong, K.C., Osman, R., Ho, H.K., & Tso, C.P. (2006) ‘Life Cycle 
Assessment Study of Solar PV Systems: An Example of 2.7 kWp Distributed Solar PV 
System in Singapore.’ Solar Energy, Vol. 80 No. 5, pp. 555-563. 
 
Kirmani, A. & Rao, A.R. (2000) ‘No Pain, No Gain: A Critical Review of the Literature 
on Signaling Unobservable Product Quality.’ Journal of Marketing, Vol. 64 (April), pp. 
66-79 
 
Klein, B. & Leffler, K.B. (1981) ‘The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual 
Performance.’ Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 89 No. 4, pp. 615-41. 
 
Langniss, O., & Praetorius, B. (2006) ‘How Much Market Do Market-Based Instruments 
Create?  An Analysis for the Case of “White” Certificates.’ Energy Policy, Vol. 34 No. 2, 
pp. 200-211. 
 
Leonig, C.D. & Stephens, J. (2011) ‘Solyndra employees: Company suffered from 
mismanagement, heavy spending.’ Washington Post, (September 22) [online] 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/solyndra-employees-company-suffered-from-
mismanagement-heavy-spending/2011/09/20/gIQAMHC3lK_story_1.html. (Accessed 25 
October 2014). 
 
Lipton, E. & Krauss, C. (2011) ‘A Gold Rush of Subsidies in the Search for Clean 
Energy.’ New York Times, (November 12), p. A1. 
 
  23 
 
Mead, W. R. (2011) ‘Green Energy Industry Staggers.’ American Interest, (October 1) 
[online]  http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2011/10/01/green-energy-industry-
staggers/. (Accessed 25 October 2014). 
 
Mishra, D. P., Heide, J.B. & Cort, S.G. (1998) ‘Information Asymmetry and Levels of 
Agency Relationships.’ Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 35 (August), pp. 277-95. 
 
Morales, A., & Roca, M. (2011) ‘Solar Silicon Price Plunges to Six-Year Low, Helping 
Trina.’ Bloomberg News, (June 17) [online] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-
16/solar-panel-raw-material-plunges-o-six-year-low-helping-trina.html. (Accessed 25 
October 2014). 
 
Mosk, M. & Greene, R. (2011) ‘Obama Fundraiser Pushed Solyndra Deal From Inside.’ 
ABC News, (October 7) [online] http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/obama-fundraiser-
pushed-solyndra-deal-inside/story?id=14691618. (Accessed 25 October 2014). 
 
North, D. C. (1991) ‘Institutions.’ Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5 No. 1, pp. 
97-112. 
 
Olson, E.L. (2014) ‘Green Innovation Value Chain Analysis of PV Solar Power.’ Journal 
of Cleaner Production, Vol. 64, pp. 73-80. 
 
Olson, E.L. (2015), ‘Green Innovation Value Chain Frame of Comparison: Market and 
Public Policy Implications.’ International Journal of Technology, Policy, and 
Management, (forthcoming). 
 
Perez, Y., & Ramos-Real, F.J. (2009) ‘The Public Promotion of Wind Energy in Spain 
from the Transaction Costs Perspective 1986-2007.’ Renewable and Sustainable Energy 
Reviews, Vol. 13 No. 5, pp. 1058-1066. 
 
Pisano, G. P. (1989) ‘Using Equity Participation to Support Exchange: Evidence from the 
Biotechnology Industry.’ Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 5 No. 1, pp. 
109-26. 
 
Saunders, D. (2011) ‘Solyndra Debacle Spotlights Obama’s Folly.’ Real Clear Politics, 
(September 4) [online] 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/09/04/solyndra_debacle_spotlights_obama
s_folly_111197.html. (Accessed 25 October 2014). 
 
Scansen, D. (2011) ‘Solyndra: Its Technology and Why It Failed.’ EDN Network, 
(November 21) [online] http://www.edn.com/design/power-
management/4368710/Solyndra-Its-technology-and-why-it-failed. (Accessed 25 October 
2014). 
 
Sovacool, B. K. (2011) ‘The Policy Challenges of Tradable Credits: A Critical Review of 
Eight Markets.’ Energy Policy, Vol. 39 No. 2, pp. 575-585. 
  24 
 
 
Styles, G. (2011) ‘Will Solar Bankruptcies be Different from Ethanol’s?’ Energy 
Outlook, (Sept. 6) [online] http://www.energytribune.com/articles.cfm/8466/Will-Solar-
Bankruptcies-Be-Different-From-Ethanols. (Accessed 25 October 2014). 
 
Styles, A. (2013) ‘Subsidizing SolarCity. A California solar-panel company could be 
another Solyndra in the making.’ National Review Online, (November 25) [online] 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/364748/subsidizing-solarcity-andrew-stiles. 
(Accessed 25 October 2014). 
 
Teece, D. J. (1996) ‘Firm organization, industrial structure, and technological 
innovation.’ Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 31 No. 2, pp. 193-224. 
 
Victor, D.G., & Yanosek, K. (2011) ‘The Crisis in Clean Energy.’ Foreign Affairs, Vol. 
90 No. 4, pp. 112-120. 
 
Wald, M.L. (2011) ‘Solar Firm Aided by Federal Loans Shuts Doors.’ New York Times, 
(August 31), p. B1. 
 
Wang, U. (2008) ‘Solyndra Rolls Out Tube-Shaped Thin Film.’ Greentechsolar, 
(October 7) [online] http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/solyndra-rolls-out-
tube-shaped-thin-film-1542. (Accessed 25 October 2014). 
 
Williamson, O.E. (1983) ‘Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange.’ 
The American Economic Review, Vol. 73 No. 4, pp. 519 – 540. 
 
Williamson, O.E. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: The Free 
Press, p. 32. 
 
Williamson, O.E. (1987) ‘Transaction cost economics: The comparative contracting 
perspective.’ Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 8 No. 4, pp. 617-25. 
 
Williamson, O. E. (1988) ‘Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance.’ The Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 43 No. 3, pp. 567-91. 
 
Williamson, O. E. (1996) The Mechanisms of Governance, New York, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Wolter, C. & Veloso, F.M. (2008) ‘The Effects of Innovation on Vertical Structure: 
Perspectives on Transaction Costs and Competences.’ Academy of Management Review, 
Vol. 33 No. 3, pp. 586-605. 
